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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Theron Hayes appeals from his conviction for battery on a correctional
officer.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Hayes with two counts of battery on a correctional officer, with
an enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 287-88, 652-53, 686.) The case
proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 710-26.) The jury convicted him on one of the two counts,
and the state dismissed the enhancement. (R., pp. 726-27; Tr., p. 608, L. 22 – p. 609, L.
8.)
Hayes moved for a new trial. (R., pp. 1108-14, 1117-1233.) The district court
denied the motion for a new trial and sentenced Hayes to serve two and one-half years
consecutive to other sentences. (R., pp. 1237-41, 1263-78.) Hayes filed a notice of appeal
within 42 days of entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 1243-62.)
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ISSUES
Hayes states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it declined to issue subpoenas
directing April Dawson, M.D., and Kevin Kaae to testify on Mr.
Hayes’ behalf?

II.

Did the district court err when it allowed the State, on crossexamination of Mr. Hayes, to inquire into specific instances of his
prior conduct towards correctional officers and other inmates?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hayes’
motion for a new trial, on the basis the district court erred as a matter
of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes from asking the correctional
officers questions related to the prison guidelines?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Was Hayes’ claim that the district court erred when it denied his pro se request for
subpoenas rendered moot when Hayes subsequently applied for, and was granted,
appointed counsel who ultimately conducted the defense at trial?
2.
Has Hayes failed to show that the district court erred in its rulings regarding the
scope of the prosecution’s cross-examination of him?
3.
Has Hayes failed to show error in the district court’s ruling that cross-examination
on how the correctional officers conducted the infraction hearing at which the battery
occurred was inadmissible?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Hayes’ Claim Of Error In The Denial Of His Pro Se Request For Subpoenas Is Moot
Because Hayes Was Represented By Counsel At Trial
A.

Introduction
While Hayes represented himself, he moved to subpoena Dr. April Dawson and

nurse Kevin Kaae to testify at trial. (R., pp. 404-06, 449-53, 610-23.) Hayes represented
that these witnesses would testify that, at some point after the altercation with the
correctional officers, Hayes had blood in his urine that was not the product of disease or
kidney stones. (R., pp. 613-17.) The district court, at the December 9, 2016, pretrial
conference, found that the proposed evidence of Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae was not
relevant. (Tr., p. 197, Ls. 9-14; p. 199, Ls. 10-15.)
Later in the hearing Hayes requested that counsel be appointed to represent him at
trial, and the district court granted the request, appointed counsel, and postponed the trial
from December 12, 2016, until February 27, 2017. (Tr., p. 213, L. 2 – p. 230, L. 24; R.,
pp. 497, 688.) The trial proceed as re-scheduled, where Hayes was represented by counsel.
(R., pp. 710-26; Tr., pp. 270-618.)
On appeal Hayes claims the district court erred by denying his pro se requests to
subpoena Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-19.) This claim, however,
was rendered moot by the appointment of counsel who then made his own determinations
of what witnesses to subpoena.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed.” State v. Barclay, 149

Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010).
3

C.

Hayes’ Claim Of Error Is Moot
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy

that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.” State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232
P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). The mootness doctrine precludes review when
“the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho
276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816
P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). The question of whether Hayes, in his pro se capacity, could
subpoena Dr. Dawson or Mr. Kaae was rendered moot once Hayes elected to invoke his
right to counsel for the trial. “Trial counsel’s decision of which witnesses to call is
encompassed in that aspect of trial counsel’s role denominated ‘trial tactics’ or ‘strategic
choices.’” Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997).
That Hayes could not while pro se subpoena these witnesses was irrelevant because the
choice of what witnesses to call was given to counsel. Once he elected to be represented
by appointed counsel, Hayes therefore no longer had a legally cognizable interest in issuing
subpoenas pro se.
The record in this case does not show that the court’s ruling in any way affected
counsel’s choice of witnesses. “This Court will not presume error on appeal, and an
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error through the record.”

State v.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009). If Hayes believes that his counsel
performed deficiently by not calling certain witnesses the proper forum for that claim is in
post-conviction, where counsel’s reasoning for his tactical decisions may be explored and
developed through evidence.
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D.

The Proposed Testimony Was Irrelevant
Even if his claim is not moot, Hayes has shown no error. In support of his motion,

Hayes submitted to the district court exhibits he claimed were related to medical procedures
he underwent after the incident. (Tr., p. 57, L. 17 – p. 59, L. 1 (“medical assault calendars”
and exhibits 46-48); see R., pp. 923-25.) The record indicates that the district court
assumed Dr. Dawson (and presumably the nurse) would testify consistently with those
exhibits. (E.g., Tr., p. 64, L. 11 – p. 67, L. 7.) Those records allege that Hayes underwent
urinalyses, starting nine days after the incident, on November 19, 30, December 17, and
February 3. (R., pp. 923-25. 1) They also state that Hayes had X-Rays taken 10 days after
the incident, more X-Rays taken 20 days after the incident, and an ultrasound taken 52 days
after the incident. (Id.)
Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency” to make the existence of any
fact of consequence “more probable or less probable.” I.R.E. 401. As pointed out by the
state, there was no dispute that there had been a physical altercation in which Hayes could
have been injured, but his injuries would not tend to prove that Hayes did not batter the
officers. (Tr., p. 85, L. 18 – p. 87, L. 6.) The district court ultimately found the proffered
testimony irrelevant. (Tr., p. 197, Ls. 9-14; p. 199, Ls. 10-15.)
Evidence that Hayes may have been injured is irrelevant to whether he battered the
correctional officers. Because it was uncontested that correctional officers used force on
Hayes in order to subdue him, any resulting injuries did not prove or disprove whether he
battered them.

1

The entries on the calendar include a “2ND,” “3RD,” “4Th” and “5Th” urinalysis, but no
mention of a first urinalysis, nor one before November 19, 2015. (R., pp. 923-25
(capitalization original).)
5

Hayes argues the evidence was relevant to his defense that “he did not commit a
battery on the officers, but rather the officers committed a battery on him.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 17. 2) Evidence that Hayes was injured does not tend to prove that he did not batter
the officers. That the evidence might prove the officers injured him is irrelevant because
the uncontested fact that the officers used force on Hayes to subdue him is in no way
exclusive of Hayes battering the officers. Thus, even though the evidence has a tendency
to show the officers used force on Hayes, such use of force does nothing to prove or
disprove the charge that Hayes battered the correctional officers. Hayes has failed to show
error by the district court.

E.

Any Error Was Necessarily Harmless
“‘Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there is a

reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have contributed to the
conviction.’” State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting
State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)). Here, even if
the court’s ruling were not moot and were erroneous, the error was harmless. First, Hayes
never offered evidence that any medical professional would testify that Hayes suffered any
injury during the November 10, 2015 incident. Rather, his evidence was limited to showing
there was blood in Hayes’ urine at some point after the incident and that causes such as
kidney stones could be ruled out. Admitting this evidence would not have had any bearing
on the trial in the absence of medical testimony showing a causal connection between the
blood in the urine and the incident on November 10, 2015. There is no reasonable

2

Hayes did not claim he battered the officers in self-defense.
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possibility that the exclusion of Hayes’ proffered, and very speculative, testimony might
have contributed to the verdict.
Second, the record, and in particular the district court’s denial of the motion for a
new trial, shows that the proffered testimony, if offered at trial, would also have been
excluded under I.R.E. 403 because it was too speculative. 3 At trial the state called Gary
Rich, the nurse who examined Hayes immediately after the incident. (Tr., p. 466, L. 6 – p.
467, L. 18.) Hayes complained of pain in his wrists and back. (Tr., p. 468, Ls. 16-22.)
The nurse was unaware of any urinalyses showing blood in the urine. (Tr., p. 474, Ls. 114; p. 476, L. 14 – p. 478, L. 17.) Hayes testified that there was blood in his urine at some
point after the incident. (Tr., p. 533, Ls. 14-19.) After trial, Hayes moved for a new trial.
(R., pp. 1108-09.) One of the issues raised was a claim of error in the district court’s ruling
that Hayes could not testify that the state withheld his medical records from him. (R., p.
1125; see R., pp. 679-80.) Specifically, Hayes argued that medical evidence of blood in
his urine would have been disclosed in the medical records and was relevant evidence for
trial. (R., pp. 1125-26.) In support of this argument Hayes submitted copies of medical
records. (R., pp. 1195-1233.)
The medical records included reports showing “moderate” blood in urine collected
on November 30, 2015. (R., pp. 1198, 1229.) Dr. Dawson saw Hayes on December 9,
2015, and ordered a renal ultrasound.

(R., p. 1199.)

The ultrasound showed

“unremarkable.” (R., p. 1232.) Hayes also presented X-ray reports from November 20,
2015, showing “degenerative changes” to his wrists, similar to prior examinations, and

3

Hayes does not contend the district court erred in relation to this claim in his new trial
motion. See Appellant’s brief, pp. 29-36.)
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showing “negative” as to his left shoulder and left hip; and from November 30, 2015,
showing negative on chest and left ribs. (R., pp. 1228, 1230.)
The district court denied the claim, finding first that it had made no pre-trial ruling
on the admissibility or relevance of the presence of blood in Hayes’ urine. (R., p. 1276.)
The trial court found that evidence of blood in Hayes’ urine “20 days after the incident”
was “too remote to be relevant.” (R., p. 1277.) The district court also reiterated that injuries
suffered on the date of the incident “would have been irrelevant to the determination of
whether [Hayes] battered the two correctional officers,” noting Hayes “never claimed selfdefense or excessive force.” (Id.) Finally, the district court said the evidence of blood in
the urine would have been excluded under I.R.E. 403 because, even if relevant, it was “a
waste of time” and ran the risk of “confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” (Id.)
The district court’s post-trial relevance and I.R.E. 403 analysis is directly relevant
to the question of whether Hayes’ proffered testimony from Dr. Dawson and Nurse Kaae
would ultimately have been admitted at trial. Hayes ultimately produced evidence there
was blood in his urine almost three weeks after the incident, and that reasons for the blood
such as kidney stones could be excluded. Such was not relevant and was inadmissible
under I.R.E. 403. Because Hayes’ proffered evidence was inadmissible as irrelevant and
under I.R.E. 403, any error in denying subpoenas for witnesses to provide substantively
similar and likewise inadmissible evidence was necessarily harmless.
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II.
Hayes Has Failed To Show Any Error In Rulings On The Scope Of Cross-Examination
A.

Introduction
Hayes exercised his right to testify in his own defense at trial. (Tr., p. 509, L. 11 –

p. 511, L. 16.) He testified that after Corrections officers found him guilty of a rules
violation he threatened to sue them, so they beat him up. (Tr., p. 514, L. 22 – p. 528, L. 1.)
He denied initiating any aggressive action, including attempting to hit, kick or grab anyone.
(Tr., p. 534, Ls. 1-10.) During cross-examination the prosecutor asked Hayes if he was
“telling this jury” that he was “respectful of the guards all the time.” (Tr., p. 536, Ls. 7-9.)
Hayes responded that “[c]ripples like [him]” cannot defend themselves so he “[had] to be
respectful.” (Tr., p. 536, Ls. 10-12.) The prosecutor, out of the presence of the jury, asked
to inquire into incidents where Hayes was not respectful of guards. (Tr., p. 537, L. 19 – p.
538, L. 22; p. 540, L. 12 – p. 544, L. 11.) Hayes’ trial counsel objected. (Tr., p. 544, L.
13 – p. 545, L. 8.) The prosecutor argued in favor of the proposed line of questioning.
(Tr., p. 545, L. 10 – p. 546, L. 12.) The trial court held that the question was governed by
I.R.E. 404(a)(3) and 608. (Tr., p. 547, L. 16 – p. 548, L. 16.) The district court found the
line of questioning, with appropriate limitation on the jury’s consideration of the evidence,
“relevant to the question of credibility” and “probative to the question of whether or not
the defendant was truthful on the witness stand.” (Tr., p. 549, L. 15 – p. 550, L. 17.)
The prosecutor then asked about eight different incidents where Hayes was
allegedly disrespectful, and Hayes denied each of them. (Tr., p. 553, L. 12 – p. 557, L. 11.)
The district court gave a limiting instruction. (Tr., p. 581, Ls. 19-23.)
On appeal Hayes argues the district court erred because I.R.E. 608 does not apply
to the admissibility of the evidence and the evidence was inadmissible under I.R.E. 403.
9

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-28.) Application of the relevant legal standards shows Hayes
has failed to show the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the appellate

court applies an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279
(2016) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d
816, 819-20 (2002)). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate
court considers whether the trial court “correctly perceived the issue as discretionary,
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable
legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)).

C.

Hayes Has Failed To Show Error
“Specific instances of the conduct of a witness” may, “in the discretion of the

district court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness concerning the character of the witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness ….” I.R.E. 608(b) (2017). This rule “expressly allows cross-examination
of the witness concerning instances of the witness’s conduct if it is probative of the
witness’s truthfulness.” State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 710, 316 P.3d 117, 122 (Ct.
App. 2013) (emphasis original) (citing State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P.2d 872,
880 (1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38, 752 P.2d 632, 640 (Ct. App. 1988)).
The prosecutor attempted to impeach Hayes’ portrayal of himself “as a disabled,
docile, passive victim” by asking him if he was respectful of the other inmates and guards
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at the prison. (Tr., p. 535, L. 25 – p. 536, L. 18; p. 537, L. 19 – p. 538, L. 1.) Hayes
responded by claiming he was always respectful because “[c]ripples like me can’t defend
their [sic] selves.” (Tr., p. 536, Ls. 10-11.) The district court allowed the state to test the
truthfulness of that claim with cross-examination regarding specific instances where Hayes
had not been respectful, and apparently did not fear that he could not defend himself. (Tr.,
p. 549, L. 15 – p. 550, L. 17.) This ruling fit the specific language of Rule 608(b): the state
was allowed “cross-examination of the witness” regarding “[s]pecific instances of
conduct” to demonstrate the “character of the witness for … untruthfulness.” Impeachment
of Hayes about his claim of being respectful to inmates and guards, and his reasons for
such respect, was properly allowed by the district court.
On appeal Hayes argues that I.R.E. 608(b) was inapplicable. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 24-25.) Specifically, he argues Rule 608(b) is limited to “‘impeachment to show
character for untruthfulness’” and does not apply to other forms of impeachment, such as
“‘impeachment to show bias or improper motive,’” or “‘impeachment by contradiction.’”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25 (quoting Guinn, 114 Idaho at 40, 752 P.2d at 642; United
States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), and citing Gem-Valley Ranches,
Inc. v. Small, 90 Idaho 354, 371, 411 P.2d 943, 953 (1966).) Assuming Hayes is correct,
and I.R.E. 607 instead of 608 controlled, then the state should have been allowed to
impeach Hayes with extrinsic evidence. Guinn, 114 Idaho at 38-39, 752 P.2d at 640-41
(court has discretion to allow impeachment with extrinsic evidence of bias); Castillo, 181
F.3d at 1133 (extrinsic evidence admissible to impeach falsehoods in a witness’s
testimony). Hayes’ argument the court erred by preventing the state from impeaching him
with extrinsic evidence is not well taken.
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Hayes’ argument that the court abused its discretion in balancing the probative
value of the evidence against its prejudice (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-27) at least argues the
district court erred against his interests. Hayes has failed, however, to show an abuse of
discretion.
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court’s
discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice – which is the tendency to suggest a decision on
an improper basis – substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v.
Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654,
873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343,
348 (Ct. App. 1993). “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a strong
preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.” State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3,
796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original).
In criminal cases, relevant evidence is often prejudicial in the sense that it is
unpleasant, but such does not mandate its exclusion from evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992) (fact that photographs depict the body
of a victim and the wounds inflicted on the victim and may tend to excite the emotions of
the jury does not mandate their exclusion from evidence). Rather, the trial court must
exercise its discretion by balancing the probative value of possibly inflammatory evidence
against the risk of unfair prejudice. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828 P.2d at 882; State v.
Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 278, 506 P.2d 1340, 1351 (1973) (acknowledging the trial court is
in a “far better position to determine whether the probative value was sufficient to
overcome any possible inflammatory effect on the jury”).
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The district court properly weighed the probative value and the potential for unfair
prejudice. It found cross-examination on whether Hayes was, as he had testified, respectful
of inmates and guards because of his physical limitations was “relevant to the question of
credibility.” (Tr., p. 549, Ls. 21-22; see also p. 550, Ls. 6-8.) The district court did not
want to litigate Hayes’ actions at different times, and thus limited the impeachment to
cross-examination only, which it concluded would not be “unduly prejudicial.” (Tr., p.
549, L. 22 – p. 550, L. 5.) The court also gave “leeway” in redirect examination and
required a curative instruction limiting consideration of the cross-examination to
credibility. (Tr., p. 550, Ls. 8-17.) The record supports the district court’s exercise of
discretion.
Even if the cross-examination was erroneously allowed, any error was harmless.
“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. The proper inquiry is whether “‘the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 12,
304 P.3d 276, 287 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)
(emphasis omitted)). Ultimately Hayes denied every act of disrespect he was questioned
about. (Tr., p. 553, L. 12 – p. 557, L. 12.) The jury was instructed that the statements of
lawyers were not evidence. (Tr., p. 576, Ls. 15-24.) Because there was ultimately no
evidence presented that Hayes acted disrespectfully to guards or inmates, any error in
allowing the asking of the questions was harmless.
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III.
Hayes Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Excluded Evidence Of
The Idaho Department Of Correction’s Policies
A.

Introduction
During the preliminary hearing Hayes asked questions regarding whether he had

been given notice of the infraction hearing during which the battery took place, as required
by “IDOC Policies and Procedures 3.1.8.” (P.H. Tr., p. 16, L. 4 – p. 17, L. 24.) The state
moved in limine to prevent the defense from asking questions ruled irrelevant in the
preliminary hearing, including “[q]uestions related to the procedure for a disciplinary
hearing according to the policies of the Idaho Department of Correction” because the
evidence was irrelevant. (R., p. 546.) The district court granted the motion in limine, and
prohibited “[q]uestions related to the procedure for a disciplinary hearing according to the
policies of the Idaho Department of Correction.” (R., p. 678.)
In his motion for a new trial, Hayes argued that the district court erred in this ruling,
claiming it “prevented the Defendant from properly impeaching the complaining witnesses
regarding their behavior during the incident in violation of the prison’s discipline and use
of force policies.” (R., p. 1123.) Specifically, it prevented the defense from demonstrating
“that the complaining witnesses acted in violation of established prison policies in how the
[sic] engaged with the defendant on the date of the incident,” which would have
“undermined the credibility of their testimony.” (R., p. 1124.) At the hearing defense
counsel added that this would be evidence the correctional officers “violated their own
policies, and if the jury knew these policies, the jury would know that they had a motivation
to lie about what happened.” (Tr., p. 657, Ls. 3-8.)
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The district court again found the policies in question irrelevant and also found
them inadmissible “as a waste of time, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury” under
I.R.E. 403. (R., pp. 1274-75.)
On appeal Hayes argues the proposed cross-examination regarding IDOC policies
was “relevant to the correctional officers’ motive to lie.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 33-35.)
Specifically, Hayes claims cross-examination would have gone to “a motive to lie as a
result of their desire to cover up their violation of the prison guidelines during the incident.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 34.) Hayes also argues the district court abused its discretion under
I.R.E. 403. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 35-36.) Hayes’ argument fails because he does not
actually articulate what regulations officers allegedly violated, how they violated them, or
why, even assuming such a violation, that would create a motive to falsely accuse Hayes
of battery. Moreover, avoiding a trial-within-a-trial on whether correctional officers
violated policy related to their conducting of the infraction hearing was exactly within the
trial court’s discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo whereas the weighing process

under I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
666, 227 P.3d 918, 920 (2010).

C.

Hayes Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Ruling That Cross-Examination
On How The Correctional Officers Conducted The Infraction Hearing Was
Inadmissible
As a preliminary matter, Hayes has failed to present a reviewable claim of error.

He has failed to articulate what policy he believes the officers violated or how.
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(Appellant’s brief, pp. 29-36.) It is a well-settled tenet of appellate review that the “party
alleging error has the burden of showing it in the record.” Akers v. D.L. White Const.,
Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014) (citation omitted). It is equally well-settled that
the appellate court will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been
assigned and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors.

State v.

Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983). Moreover, “[a] party waives an
issue on appeal if either authority or argument are lacking.” State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho
257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Hayes’ claims related to impeachment with policies are not
reviewable because they are so vague as to be meaningless.
Even if sufficiently specific for review, Hayes’ argument fails to establish error.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. See also State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547,
768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, but relevant
evidence “is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules.”

I.R.E. 402.

“Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented
by the parties.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) (citation
omitted). The mere existence of policies on prison procedure for disciplinary hearings in
no discernable way creates an inference that the officers lied when they claimed Hayes
battered them.
Hayes’ theory is apparently that the existence of guidelines created an incentive for
the correctional officers to falsely claim that their behavior was within the scope of those
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guidelines. (Appellant’s brief, p, 34.) First, the mere existence of policies does not create
an incentive to lie. Second, even if it gave the officers some incentive to lie about how
they conducted the infraction hearing in which the battery occurred, it would not create an
incentive to lie about the battery itself. The district court held that “asking questions related
to prison procedure for disciplinary hearings [and] whether the complaining witnesses had
been trained by the prison system to conduct an infraction hearing” were “irrelevant to the
issues to be tried.” (R., pp. 1274-75.) Hayes has failed to show error in this ruling.
Nor has Hayes shown error in the district court’s ruling on I.R.E. 403. Evidence
may be excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the probative value is “substantially
outweighed” by the “danger” of “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403 (2017). See also State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248
P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App.
1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). Here the
district court concluded that the evidence was inadmissible because of “waste of time,
confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” (R., p. 1275.) “A trial should not stray far
from the central issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant” to allow a “full-scale
investigation” of other matters. State v. MacDonald, 131 Idaho 367, 371, 956 P.2d 1314,
1318 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating that court may avoid a “trial within a trial” by limiting inquiry
into collateral matters). Hayes’ denials notwithstanding, to the extent cross-examination
related to the officers’ conducting of the infraction hearing was relevant, such relevance
was outweighed by the danger of wasting time, confusing the issues and misleading the
jury. Hayes has shown no abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hayes’ conviction for battery on
a correctional officer.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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